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Abstract
In this study, we concentrate on replacing the process of extract-
ing hand-crafted acoustic feature with end-to-end DNN using
complementary high-resolution spectrograms. As a result of
advance in audio devices, typical characteristics of a replayed
speech based on conventional knowledge alter or diminish in
unknown replay configurations. Thus, it has become increas-
ingly difficult to detect spoofed speech with a conventional
knowledge-based approach. To detect unrevealed characteris-
tics that reside in a replayed speech, we directly input spectro-
grams into an end-to-end DNN without knowledge-based in-
tervention. Explorations dealt in this study that differentiates
from existing spectrogram-based systems are twofold: comple-
mentary information and high-resolution. Spectrograms with
different information are explored, and it is shown that addi-
tional information such as the phase information can be com-
plementary. High-resolution spectrograms are employed with
the assumption that the difference between a bona-fide and a
replayed speech exists in the details. Additionally, to verify
whether other features are complementary to spectrograms, we
also examine raw waveform and an i-vector based system. Ex-
periments conducted on the ASVspoof 2019 physical access
challenge show promising results, where t-DCF and equal error
rates are 0.0570 and 2.45 % for the evaluation set, respectively.
Index Terms: replay detection, anti-spoofing, speaker recogni-
tion, representation learning, deep neural networks
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are being widely
applied to various industries. However, spoofing attacks are
becoming a threat to the reliability of ASV systems, necessi-
tating the study of spoofing detection systems. Following this
trend, the Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Coun-
termeasures (ASVspoof) initiative is providing a platform for
researches to follow-up, study, and compare spoofing detection
systems. The ASVspoof Challenge has covered various kinds
of spoofing attacks, such as text-to-speech (TTS) and voice
conversion (VC) in 2015, and replay attacks in 2017 [1, 2].
ASVspoof2019 challenge deals with advances in TTS and VC
technology as logical access and controlled simulation of replay
attack as physical access [3] VC and TTS require expertise and
specialized equipment. In contrast, replay attacks does not re-
quire any expertise nor specialized equipment. It can be simply
conducted by acquiring target speaker’s voice using a recording
device, and then replaying using a playback device. In this pro-
cess, a different combination of replay and playback device with
∗These authors contributed equally.
† Corresponding author
This research was supported by Basic Science Research Program
through the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF) funded by
the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning(2017R1A2B4011609)
background environment can be used which is referred to as
‘replay configuration’. Despite the simplicity of attack scheme,
replay attack has been proved as an effective way to deceive an
ASV system. This study concentrates on replay detection task.
Through a survey on previous studies in replay detection
including past ASVspoof competitions, we found that a num-
ber of researches have focused on finding discriminative fea-
tures to improve spoofing detection [4–7]. Such features in-
clude constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC), inverse Mel-
filter cepstral coefficients (IMFCC), linear prediction cepstral
coefficients (LPCC), and group delay (GD)-grams. These fea-
tures concentrate on representing the characteristics of a speech,
that is considered discriminative in conventional knowledge for
replay detection. For instance, IMFCC concentrates on high
frequency bands, utilizing the knowledge that high frequency
bands in replayed speech are often distorted. However, as a
result of advances in both recording and playback devices, dis-
tortion that reside in a replayed speech diminishes. We hypoth-
esize that because of this phenomenon, discriminative power of
conventional features will decrease.
To deal with decreasing distortions in replayed speech, we
explore an approach of minimizing the intervention of con-
ventional knowledge and fully exploit DNN-based data driven
approach. Our main focus in this study is to provide ap-
propriate unprocessed, complementary information with high-
resolution to facilitate end-to-end DNN. Complementary infor-
mation combining not only general spectrograms which include
magnitude information, but also phase information and power
spectral density (PSD) is explored. We explore phase informa-
tion, which has been shown to be effective in replay attack de-
tection [6,8–10], with PSD for concentrating on the distribution
of the power signal over frequencies rather than concentrating
on spectral contents. To verify the effectiveness, we investigate
model-level and score-level ensembles of various spectrograms
with PSD. Experiments confirm that using complementary fea-
tures contributes in the direct modeling of spectrogram-based
deep neural networks (DNNs).
Furthermore, we used high-resolution of 2048 fast Fourier
transform (FFT) bins for all features. The purpose is being able
to represent the subtle difference between bona-fide speech and
spoofed speech. Because of the advancement of replay attacks,
the difference may be more subtle, and less obvious, requir-
ing focus on minute distinctions. Our comparative experiments
show that the resolution significantly affects actual performance
(see Table 3).
2. End-to-end DNN
We introduce an end-to-end DNN that is used to deal with de-
creasing distortions in replayed speech by minimizing the inter-
vention of conventional knowledge. Using spectrograms as in-
put, end-to-end DNN replaces the sub-process of selecting dis-
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Figure 1: Visualization of bona-fide (upper) and replayed (lower) spectrograms and PSD: magnitude (left), phase (mid), and PSD
(right). Minor differences in small regions (pink boxes) demonstrate the difficulty of replay attack spoofing detection task and the
necessity of high-resolution.
criminative parts, which makes the intermediate representations
adaptable to the data. An output of this model directly indicates
a decision score when spectrograms are input, which simplifies
the process pipeline. The state-of-the-art in various audio do-
main tasks has adopted an approach that utilizes a DNN that
directly inputs spectrograms [11–14].
The DNN used in this study comprises convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNNs), gated recurrent units (GRUs) and fully
connected layers (CNN-GRU) as used in [15–17]. In this ar-
chitecture, input features are first processed using convolutional
layers to extract frame-level embeddings. Convolutional layers
comprise residual blocks [18] with identity mapping [19] to fa-
cilitate the training of deep architectures. Specifically, the first
convolutional layer of our model processes local adjacent time
and frequency domains and is gradually aggregated by repeat-
ing pooling operations to extract frame-level embedding. Then,
a GRU layer is employed to aggregate extracted frame-level fea-
tures into a single utterance-level feature. One fully connected
layer is used to transform the utterance-level feature. An out-
put layer with two nodes indicates either the input utterance is
bona-fide or spoofed.
3. Complementary high-resolution feature
In this section, we introduce the key aspects to facilitate train-
ing end-to-end DNN without intervention based on human
priors; providing complementary information and using high-
resolution. To generalize towards unknown replay configura-
tions, we hypothesize that the approach of providing varied, raw
information as input and performing data-driven feature selec-
tion with DNN would provide a more appropriate process of
feature extraction for spoofing detection. Based on this hypoth-
esis, spectrograms including various information with high-
resolution are explored in expectation of outperforming acous-
tic features extracted with conventional knowledge. Specif-
ically, phase information and PSD was exploited in addition
to general spectrograms including magnitude information. In
general, a spectrogram refers to a magnitude spectrogram con-
taining absolute values of the fast Fourier transform (FFT).
Whereas phase information was often overlooked in many au-
dio domains, recent studies have demonstrated that phase-based
features provide discriminative information for replay detection
[6, 7, 20]. We use magnitude spectrogram and phase spectro-
gram supposing that phase information would supplement the
magnitude information without requiring an additional extrac-
tion process, as both use partial information of FFT. We also
exploit PSD for further improvement. Because PSD concen-
trates on the distribution of signal power over frequencies, it
differs from magnitude or phase, which concentrate on spectral
contents. Concurrently using PSD and spectrograms therefore
enables consideration of the frequency distribution of the over-
all signal strength as well as the harmonics of amplitude and
phase in the signal. To exploit this diverse information, we ex-
plore the combinations in both the model-level and score-level.
Model-level ensemble inputs various features to a single DNN,
whereas score-level ensemble exploits multiple DNNs and con-
ducts score summation of DNNs’ outputs, respectively. To fur-
ther analyze the relations between complementary information,
we compared each combination using different spectrograms.
Figure 1 shows that, even with the same speech, different clues
(pink boxes) for spoofing detection can be presented, depending
on the types of spectrograms used.
As noted previously, with the advance in quality of audio
devices, the difficulty of detecting spoofed utterances has been
increased, as prominent differences between bona-fide speech
and spoofed speech have been reduced. This necessitates the
usage of high-resolution input that can be used to demonstrate
the subtle differences residing in replay spoofed utterances. A
high-resolution of 2,048 FFT bins was used for all spectrograms
in this study. We were inspired by the experiments in Tom
et al. [6] that attention-based GD-grams significantly outper-
formed spectrograms. The GD-grams used in the Tom et al. [6]
are obtained using 2,048 FFT bins, which had higher resolution
than spectrograms. We hypothesized that the difference in reso-
lution could have also conducted a key role to the performance
besides the difference of used feature. To verify this hypothe-
Table 1: DNN architecture (l: length of input sequence).
layer output shape kernel size stride
Conv1 l × 1024× 16 3× 7 1× 1
Res1 (l/2)× 257× 32 3× 5 2× 4
Res2 (l/4)× 65× 64 3× 5 2× 4
Res3 (l/8)× 17× 128 3× 5 2× 4
Pool (l/8)× 1× 128 1× 17 1× 17
GRU 1× 512 - -
Dense1 64 512× 64 -
Output 2 64× 2 -
sis, we conducted an comparative experiment. Results shown in
Table 3 match our hypothesis where equal error rate (EER) of
a spectrogram using 2,048 FFT bins significantly outperformed
an identical system with 512 FFT bins.
4. Experimental settings
DNN training was implemented using Keras, a deep learning
library for python, with a Tensorflow backend [21–23]. The
i-vector extraction was conducted using the Kaldi toolkit [24].
4.1. Dataset
We used the ASVspoof 2019 physical access dataset for all
experiments. This dataset comprises 54,000 utterances as
the training set, 29,700 utterances as the development set,
and 137,457 utterances as the evaluation set. Utterances are
recorded from 20 speakers (8 male, 12 female) at a 16-kHz sam-
pling rate with 16-bit resolution. Training and development data
comprises 27 different acoustic configurations using 3 room
sizes, 3 levels of reverberation, and 3 speaker-to-ASV micro-
phone distances. 9 different replay configurations are used, as
combinations of 3 categories of attacker-to-talker recording dis-
tances and 3 categories of loudspeaker quality. The acoustic
and replay configurations of the evaluation set are different from
those of the training and development set.
4.2. Spectrograms, raw waveforms, and i-vector extraction
Spectrograms were extracted using a hamming window with a
length of 50 ms and a shift size of 20 ms. Representation using
magnitude, phase spectrogram, and PSD were extracted with
2,048 FFT bins each. The number of the time axis was fixed to
120 (≈ 2.4 s), by either cropping long utterances or duplicat-
ing short utterances at the training phase for batch construction,
depending on their lengths. Whole utterances were input at the
evaluation phase without duration adjustment.
Raw waveforms were directly input to the DNN without
any pre-processing. The pre-emphasis layer was excluded,
which differs from the setup in [16], based on a comparison ex-
periment. For batch construction, the length of each utterance
was fixed to 26,244 samples (≈ 1.64 s) by either performing
random cropping for long utterances or duplicating for short ut-
terances. At the evaluation phase, whole utterances were input
to the DNN.
The i-vectors were extracted using a universal background
model with 256 diagonal Gaussian components which input 20-
dimensional Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients with its first
and second derivatives, comprising 60-dimensional acoustic
features. 200-dimensional i-vectors were extracted, and neither
linear discriminant analysis nor length normalization were ap-
plied.
Table 2: Performance comparison between spectrogram-based
systems with different types, raw waveform, and i-vector on the
development set. Spectrogram-based with more than one type
shows model-level ensemble results.
System t-DCF EER (%)
Baseline (CQCC-GMM) 0.1953 9.87
Spec-magnitude 0.0482 1.76
Spec-psd 0.1153 3.74
Spec-phase 0.2145 8.04
Raw waveform 0.1915 8.03
i-vector 0.2119 8.74
Spec-magnitude&psd 0.0491 1.75
Spec-magnitude&phase 0.0590 2.11
Spec-psd&phase 0.1159 3.91
Spec-magnitude&psd&phase 0.0688 2.11
Spec-score-level ensemble 0.0306 1.05
4.3. DNN architecture
A slightly modified ResNet was used for modeling the spectro-
grams, accounting for different stride sizes for time and fre-
quency domains due to high-resolution in the frequency do-
main, and the number of residual blocks was adjusted to fit the
provided ASV2019 physical access dataset. The raw waveform
CNN-GRU model, proposed in [17], was used with a few mod-
ifications: one less residual block, a different specified input
utterance length at training phase to fit the dataset, and addi-
tional loss functions for training (center loss [25] and speaker
basis loss [26]). This model first extracts 128-dimensional
frame-level representations using 1-dimensional convolutional
layers. Then a GRU layer with 512 nodes combines the ex-
tracted frame-level features into utterance-level features.
A simple fully-connected DNN with 3 layers, each with
1,024 nodes, was used for i-vector modeling. For all DNNs, he
normal initialization [27], weight decay with λ = 1e−4 was ap-
plied and trained with AMSGrad optimizer [28]. Additionally,
for all systems, the output layer has two nodes, each indicat-
ing bona-fide and spoofed utterances. The output layer’s node
value that indicates a bona-fide utterance was directly used as
the score (in end-to-end fashion) without additional modeling
when an utterance was input. The DNN architecture is summa-
rized in Table 112.
5. Result analysis
In this section, we first evaluate the single systems, then verify
the effect of using complementary features in model-level and
score-level, and then demonstrate that high-resolution is neces-
sary. First, the evaluations of single systems are shown in the
2nd to 6th rows of Table 2. All single systems clearly outper-
form the CQCC baseline. Magnitude spectrogram, which uses
the absolute value of FFT, seems most appropriate for replay
attack spoofing detection.
Second, the effect of using complementary spectrograms is
analyzed. The results of ensemble systems in model-level and
score-level fusion are shown in the 7th to 10th rows and the
1Implementation of raw waveform processing, spectrograms ex-
traction, and DNN architecture are in https://github.com/
\Jungjee/ASV2019_competition_Jung
2Modified model in PyTorch with training script is in https://
github.com/Jungjee/ASVspoof2019_PA
Table 5: Performance comparison on the evaluation set using various attacker-to-talker distances and loudspeaker quality of the CQCC
baseline and our submitted primary system. Two sets of labels refer to attacker-to-talker distance (A: 10-50 cm, B: 50-100 cm, C: far
than 100 cm) and loudspeaker of quality (A: perfect, B: high, C: low) respectively.
Metric System Pooled AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
t-DCF CQCC-baseline 0.2454 0.4975 0.1751 0.0529 0.4658 0.1483 0.0433 0.5025 0.1360 0.0461Primary 0.0570 0.1603 0.0416 0.0207 0.0839 0.0232 0.0111 0.0529 0.0184 0.0081
EER CQCC-baseline 11.04 25.28 6.16 2.13 21.87 5.26 1.61 21.10 4.70 1.79Primary 2.45 6.65 1.68 0.82 3.33 0.90 0.45 2.17 0.63 0.30
Table 3: Performance comparison of various FFT resolutions.
Magnitude spectrogram, single best system, was used for com-
parison. In these experiments, window length and shift size
were fixed to 30 ms and 10 ms respectively to ensure that the
number of samples within a window is greater than nFFT. The
performance difference of the nFFT 2,048 model with that of
Table 3 is due to the different window length and shift size.
System nFFT t-DCF EER (%)
Spec-magnitude
2048 0.0894 3.07
1024 0.1226 3.81
512 0.2488 7.83
11th row of Table 2, respectively. Model-level did not show im-
provement, but score-level resulted in significant improvement.
Surprisingly, including model-level ensemble systems in score-
level ensemble additionally brought further performance im-
provement where score-level ensemble of 7 spectrogram-based
systems demonstrated an EER of 1.05 %. To verify if other
features can also complement various high-resolution spectro-
grams, we explored two more features. We explored raw wave-
form and i-vector because raw waveform does not include any
pre-processing, and i-vector is a well-known utterance-level
representation extracted based on human knowledge.
Next, Table 3 demonstrates the necessity of high-resolution
by comparing performance with different numbers of FFT bins.
Results show that high-resolution features are indeed critical for
replay attack detection. Additionally, by comparing magnitude
spectrogram systems with 2,048 FFT bins in Table 2 and Ta-
ble 3, there was a considerable performance difference between
spectrograms with a 50-ms window and a 20-ms shift in com-
parison to a 30-ms window and a 10 ms shift, where EERs were
1.76 % and 3.07 % respectively. Through this result, we note
that the window length and shift size are also crucial for replay
attack detection, as reported in [29].
Table 4 shows the results of submitted systems for the
ASV2019 physical access challenge. The magnitude spectro-
gram based system was submitted as Single. Based on the
improvement brought with score-level ensemble, the primary
system comprises spectrogram, raw waveform, and i-vector
based models. The combined i-vector and 7 spectrograms based
model was submitted as Contrastive1, and the combined raw
waveform and 7 spectrograms based model was submitted as
Contrastive2. Adding both raw waveform and i-vector further
reduced EER to 0.96 %, and was submitted as the Primary sys-
tem for the competition.
Performance analysis of the baseline CQCC system and the
‘Primary’ submission on different replay configurations, mainly
for attacker-to-talker distance and replay device quality, is ad-
Table 4: t-DCF and EERs for the submissions to the ASV2019
physical access challenge condition development and evalua-
tion set.
Submission t-DCF EER (%)val eval val eval
Primary 0.0244 0.0570 0.96 2.45(7 spec+wave+i-vec)
Single 0.0482 0.1255 1.76 4.79(spec-mag)
Contrastive1 0.0246 0.0692 0.98 2.81(7 spec+i-vec)
Contrastive2 0.0284 0.0632 1.10 2.73(7spec+wave)
dressed in Table 5. Results demonstrate that the proposed sys-
tem clearly outperforms the baseline regardless of replay con-
figurations in terms of both t-DCF and EER. Although both
attacker-to-talker distance and replay device quality affected the
performance significantly, our ‘Primary’ system was more ro-
bust towards replay spoofing using high quality devices. For re-
play attacks using high quality device (compare AA, BA, and
CA), the baseline system consistently exhibited EER higher
than 20 % where our ‘Primary’ submission could show im-
proved performance as attacker-to-talker distance decreased.
We interpret that using high-resolution played a key role for
this result.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we focus on replacing the hand-crafted feature ex-
traction process by directly modeling spectrograms using DNNs
in end-to-end fashion. As advanced recording and playback
devices arise, characteristics of a speech, considered discrim-
inative in conventional knowledge for replay detection dimin-
ish. Thus, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish
bona-fide speech from spoofed speech. To detect unrevealed
characteristics that reside in a replayed speech, we directly in-
put spectrograms into an end-to-end DNN without knowledge-
based intervention. Utilizing explorations of this study such as
complementary information and high-resolution further facili-
tates a data-driven approach. Additionally, the ensemble use
of different features, including raw waveform and i-vector, was
verified to further increase performance. The primary system
submitted to the ASV2019 challenge demonstrated a t-DCF of
0.0570 and an EER of 2.45 % and was compared to a t-DCF of
0.2454 and an EER of 11.04 % baseline CQCC-GMM on the
ASV2019 physical access challenge evaluation set.
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